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INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS ON INVESTORS. 
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(Under the direction of Professor Fredrick Huszagh) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance has become a bonafide subset of company’s law that is concerned 
with who directs the company and for whose benefit.  Its application varies in countries 
found in the main legal jurisdictions of common and civil law. This thesis identifies these 
differences by highlighting national corporate governance systems existing in Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States. Together, these countries represent systems 
adopted by several countries located on all continents. Increased cross border investment 
in this era of globalization has been significantly affected by these governance systems. 
The thesis shows the reasons why investors, multinational corporations and nations have 
put corporate governance on their agenda’s. The thesis also discusses the theory of 
convergence, which predicts that competition will eventually cause the various national 
governance systems to converge into a single model. Finally, the attempt to create this 
single model by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development is 
explored.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporation, probably more than any other influence, is the organizational form that 
conditions the nature and quality of people’s lives, whether or not they work for one1.  
People have predominantly turned to corporations to achieve economic success as well as 
for many other purposes 2.  Similarly at a national level, in most economies, corporate 
enterprises play a critical role in shaping economic outcomes through the decisions they 
make about investments, employment, and trade and income distribution3.   
 Indeed it has been boldly suggested that today corporations are effectively more 
powerful than governments4. Whether they are or not is arguable, but this suggestion led 
the writers mind to deduce that perhaps ‘corporate governance’ is a term not very 
different from ‘good governance’ which is commonly used to describe the positive 
attributes of democratic nations. In both scenarios‘, there are institutions to be governed, 
persons vying for elected office and the exercise of universal suffrage. The difference lies 
in semantics. When discussing corporate governance, instead of a country to be 
                                                                 
1 Courtney C. Brown, Putting The Corporate Board To Work 3 (1976).  
2 Id. 
3 Mary O’Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 annals am. acad. poll. & soc. 
sci. 153, 154 (2000). 
4 Jon Ralls,Corporate governance-who cares? International fund Strategies, (visited April 22 
2002) http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/jon/ifs/9706_cvr.htm. 
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governed, there is a corporation at stake. Where one would normally have politicians 
vying for office, we have directors and the electorate is comprised of hundreds or perhaps 
thousands of shareholders. In short, corporate governance becomes to a corporation what 
good governance is to a nation. 
 The origin of the word ‘governance’ comes from the Latin word ‘gubernare’ 
which means to rule or steer5.  A defined governance structure is necessary whether the 
body in question is a nation, state, town, professional society or business corporation.  
Corporate governance, in particular, is concerned with the processes by which corporate 
entities are governed. That is the exercise of power over the direction of the enterprise, 
the supervision and control of executive actions, the concern for the effect of the entity on 
the other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and the regulation of the 
corporation within the jurisdiction in which it operates6.   
 In their 1932 publication of  'The Modern Corporation and Private Property‘, 
Berle and Means developed a model of publicly held corporations that set the terms of 
the modern debate of corporate governance7. In this influential book8, the authors 
asserted that while the law treated shareholders as the owners of a company, investors in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 R. I. Tricker, Corporate Governance – Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies 
and their Boards of Directors 9 (1984). 
6 Id. at 8. 
7 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprises, in 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 201 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000). 
8 To read discussions on corporate governance vis-à-vis the Berles and Means theory on the 
public corporation see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 Harv. J. 
L. & Pol’y 671, 674(1995); Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nature: Evolution, Path Dependence and 
Corporate Governance, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 279, 281(2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Current 
Trends in Corporate Governance: Going From London to Milan Via Toronto 10 duke j. comp. & 
int’l l. 5, 13(1999); BROWN, supra note 1, at xix.   
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public corporations usually did not act in the manner one would expect of an owner. The 
reason being that stock was owned by many dispersed shareholders none of who owned 
enough shares to impact on the management. Instead shareholders allowed management 
to deal with matters of importance and run the company, resulting in the separation of 
ownership and control9.  In short the book showed how professional managers were not 
accountable to the owners. This scholarship pointed to the narrow view of corporate 
governance, which was how to ensure that managers followed the interest of 
shareholders. However a broader definition of corporate governance in which the 
interests of the corporations many stakeholders, beyond just the shareholders, are taken 
into account is gaining ground10. 
 In the legal realm corporate governance has now developed as a separate and 
definable area of corporation law, which applies to many different types of companies 
and industries11. Although it started to develop in places like the US in the 1970`s12, by 
the early 1990’s it was still considered fairly new in most parts of the world13 but by the 
late 1990‘s it was a major and contentious issue in both advanced and developing 
economies14. It was soon appearing on international agendas15. Currently, the subject has 
                                                                 
9 Cheffins, supra note 8.   
10 Xavier Vives, Corporate Governance: Does it matter?, in Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives 1 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000). 
11 Peter Rodger, Corporate Governance in the Global Mutual Fund Industry, 28 Int’l Bus. Law. 
243 (2000).  
12 Details of the development of corporate governance in the United States are given in Chapter 3. 
infra. P. 18. 
13 Kevin Keasey et al, Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Analysis 2 (Kevin Keasey 
et al, eds., 1997). 
14 O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 153. 
15 Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Towards a Cross-Culture Theory of 
Corporate Governance Systems , 26 del. j. corp. l. 147, 151 (2001). 
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become increasingly important not only from a legal standpoint, but as a multi 
disciplinary subject of economics, business ethics and politics16. 
 The boundaries of corporate governance have long been a standing topic of debate 
as have issues concerning its importance and application. A lot of legal jurisdictions have 
developed their own standards. One possible explanation has been due to divergent 
economic, political and historic backgrounds17. As trade barriers fall, markets expand and 
technology advances it has become easier for investors to invest in corporations in 
foreign countries18. This has resulted in the flexibility of local governance practices that 
are changing to accommodate global trends19. 
 Currently there are number of contemporary issues going on in this field. One 
debate is which system of corporate governance is better and how can they be improved 
with codes of best conduct20.  Another issue is the growing pressure on national corporate 
governance systems to merge especially in light of integrated financial markets21. A 
theory of convergence predicts that national governance systems will eventually merge 
into one model22. Ahead of this theory is an attempt to ‘globalize’ corporate governance 
through ‘universal’ principles adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development23.   
                                                                 
16 Vives, supra note 10. 
17 Licht, supra note 15, at 148. 
18 Cheffins, supra note 8, at 5. 
19 Id. 
20 Vives, supra note 10, at 1. 
21 O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 154. 
22 Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 
Am.J.Comp.L.329, 329- 356 (2001). 
23 International Corporate Governance Network (visited April 24.2002) 
www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm  
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 This thesis draws from the debate of all these current issues. Its main aim is 
twofold. Firstly it studies the national corporate governance systems that have been 
adopted by different countries and distinguishes the elements of each system. The two 
dominant governance models are the market-oriented model found in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and the bank/labor model found in continental Europe and Japan24. This thesis 
shall examine the characteristics of these models in selected countries. A study will also 
be done of what is possibly the first attempt to ‘globalize’ corporate governance through 
principles formulated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
(OECD). The second aim is to study the implications of these national corporate 
governance systems and the global system on investors, multinational corporations and 
other countries. This is particularly important in this era of technological and 
telecommunication revolution when it has become easier for investors to invest in 
corporations located in different countries and continents. In a nutshell this is the 
theoretical framework of this thesis.  
The second chapter will explore the various definitions of corporate governance 
and will attempt to condense, into a single chapter features and issues that have shaped 
ideas on governance as a legal discipline.  
 The third chapter focuses on corporate governance practices in the common law 
and civil law jurisdictions and elaborates their salient differences. A further analysis of 
these distinctions is undertaken in a study of the national governance systems of 
                                                                 
24 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of 
Global Corporate Governance, 84 Cornell l. rev. 1133, 1134 (1999). 
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Germany, Japan, United States25 and the United Kingdom26. These countries have been 
selected because collectively they represent some of the distinct features found in both 
legal jurisdictions. The impact of these different national systems on the investor and 
multinational corporations will be discussed. In a similar fashion, the fourth chapter 
discusses globalization vis-à-vis the corporate governance principles of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the theory of convergence. Scholarly 
arguments in favor of and against globalization and its implications will be considered. A 
brief conclusion ends the discussion in Chapter five.  
 The overall result of this thesis shall be an understanding of the international 
corporate governance systems that currently exist, theories that have been formed and 
how the systems affect investors and nations in this era of globalization.  
 
 
                                                                 
25 Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary 
Society: Corporate Governance at Crossroads, 62-sum law & contemp. probs.9, 51(1999). 
Where is noted that together, the United States, Germany and Japan comprise three of the world’s 
largest industrial economies in the world and at the end of 1994, 350 of the worlds 500 largest 
non-financial companies were found in one of these three countries. Also their governance 
systems have spread to other countries. In Europe countries like Austria, Belgium, and Hungary 
and to a lesser extent France, Switzerland, much of northern Europe and newly liberalized 
countries of Eastern Europe have evolved their system on Germanic lines.  The influence of the 
Japanese governance system is evident in Asia where it has been the largest direct foreign 
investor in the last decade. Variants of the Anglo-American system found in the United States are 
found in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Europe. 
26 Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance, 34 cornell int’l l.J.321, 336 (2001). Where it is states that British company law and 
institutions have influenced the Pacific Rim, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and India. In Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLE FEATURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
A.   What is Corporate Governance? 
The absence of any real consensus of what corporate governance is means there is no 
single definition of the term27. One author in the early nineties described corporate 
governance as a topic recently conceived, as yet ill defined and consequently blurred at 
the edges28. However this opinion does not stand in the present age given the plethora of 
academic writing and research in this area. Over the years the subject has been written on 
extensively from the standpoint of academics, legal practitioners, economists and the 
like29. 
 Academicians like Monks and Minow30 have defined corporate governance as the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations. The primary participants being: the shareholders, the management (led by 
                                                                 
27 Kevin Keasey et al., The Corporate Governance Problem - Competing Diagnosis and Solutions, 
in Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues 2 (Kevin Keasey et al, eds., 1997). 
28 Nigel G. Maw et al, Maw On Corporate Governance 1 (1994). 
29 John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 am. j. comp. l. 501 (2000). 
30 Gregory V. Varallo and Daniel A. Dreisbach, Fundamentals of Corporate Governance; A 
Guide for Directors and Corporate Counsel, 52 bus. law. 729 (1997), where Monk is described 
as the one of the founding gurus of corporate governance.  
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the chief executive officer), and the board of directors. Other participants include the 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the community31. 
 An internationally accepted definition used by the Organization for Economic 
Development Cooperation reads:  
“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance.”32  
 
One common theme coming through is that corporate governance is ‘a matrix of legal 
responsibilities’ among the different participants33. This is because the right, obligations 
and impact of the relationships amongst them play a role in determining the corporate 
direction, strategy and performance34. Corporate governance also calls for the study into 
the intricacies of the relationships of the various parties of the corporation and the 
relationship it shares with persons that own it, manage it and other stakeholders35. 
 When we look back at the Berle and Means theory of the modern public 
corporation, they demonstrated that the direction of the business corporation was no 
longer in the hands of those who owned stock in them, the shareholders, but was in the 
hands of those hired to operate the company, the managers and directors36. This was 
                                                                 
31 Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 4 (1995). 
32 Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (visited March 14 2002)  
www.oecd.org/daf/governance/Q & As.htm. 
33 Maw, supra note 28, at 3. 
34 Monks, supra note 31, at 1. 
35 Id. 
36 Richard Ellis, foreword in BROWN, supra note 1, at xix.  
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considered to be the inevitable feature of the public corporation at the time. It was not 
until recently that the possibility of uniting ownership and control existed37.  
 The advent of institutional investors changed the corporate scenario as 
shareholding became more concentrated and the Berle and Means theory model of public 
held corporations was no longer valid38.  The impact of the institutional investors will be 
further discussed in the next chapter. Suffice to say, for the moment, that where 
individual shareholders previously had no clout, this new breed of investors has the 
power and influence to demand accountability from the corporations.  Today's 
institutional investors have the largest concentration of investment dollars and the 
sharpest growing rates39. Unsatisfied shareholders no longer divest themselves of their 
interests in companies but demand reform on a myriad of issues ranging from 
environmental issues to social reform and even changes in corporate practice40. 
 
B.   Corporate Constituents. 
The law speaks of a corporation as a ‘legal person’ created separate from its owners and 
having statutory rights and responsibilities41. There are four main characteristics that are 
essential to a   corporate form. These are; limited liability, legal personality. transferable 
investor rights and centralized management42. The concept of the corporation in countries 
whose governance structures this paper will review; Germany, Japan, United Kingdom 
                                                                 
37 Bainbridge, supra note 8 at 671, 672 (1995). 
38  Id. 
39 Carol B, Swanson, Corporate Governance: sliding Seamlessly into the 21st Century, 21 j. corp. 
l. 417, 421 (1996). 
40 James C. Worthy and Robert Neuschel, Emerging Issues in Corporate Governance 1 (1984). 
41 Tricker, supra note 5, at 10. 
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and United States, is basically the same. However the precise details and governance 
mechanisms differ43. 
 The most significant players in the corporate world are the shareholders, the board 
of directors and the executive managers. Although for countries like Japan and Germany 
it shall later be shown that banks and other investors that own indirect controlling 
interests in the corporations occupy prominent positions in the governance systems44. 
 The notion of accountability in governance shows that it is a two way street. Just 
as the corporation is responsible towards its shareholders and other stakeholders, 
governance practices determine how these shareholders and stakeholders monitor and 
control the corporation45.  
 
Shareholders. 
Shareholders are people who own a certificate representing entitlement to a proportional 
share of the corporation46. The fact that the shareholders are the owners of a corporation 
goes to the root of corporate governance47. This ownership confers certain rights and 
obligations that are determined by law. Some of the more important rights the 
shareholders have are; to vote, transfer their shares, to sue the directors or managers for 
breach of duty, the right to certain information from the company and when the company 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
42  Monks, supra note 3, at 11. 
43 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Corporate Governance and Competition, in Theoretical and 
Empirical Perspectives 23 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000). 
44 Vives, supra note 10, at 3. 
45 Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment; The 
Search for the Best of Both Worlds, 33 vand j. transnat’l l. 829, 833 (2000). 
46 Monks, supra note 31, at 100. 
47  Maw, supra note 28, at 1. 
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is liquidated, to residual rights once the creditors are paid48. Shareholders influence the 
corporation management by exercising their voting rights at the general meeting to elect 
the board of directors49. They may also use the proxy process to introduce shareholder 
proposals50. In the United States they also have additional power to commence derivative 
suits against the corporation to correct wrongs done to the corporation51. Individual 
shareholders may have little impact because of their minority shares, but the advent of 
institutional shareholders, at least in the common law jurisdictions, has seen a greater 
influence exerted on managers52. However in many countries in the civil jurisdiction the 
shareholders have less influence. For instance in Japan they virtually have none except to 
supply capital53. 
 
The Board of Directors. 
The Board of directors is a crucial part of the corporate structure54. It is the link between 
those involved in the day-to-day running of the corporation, the managers, and those who 
own it, the shareholders55.  The board is concerned with a broader view and long term 
strategic planning56. It determines the corporate strategy, monitors the implementation 
                                                                 
48  Id. 
49 Maw, supra note 28, at 7. 
50Paul J. N. Halpern, Systematic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems, in Corporate 
Governance and Globalization 9 (Stephen S. Cohen and Gavin Boyd eds.,2000). 
51  Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2nd cir. 1982). 
52 Vives, supra note 10, at 7.  
53 Monks, supra note 31, at 268. 
54 Id at 178. 
55 Id 
56 Brown, supra note 1, at 6. 
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processes and supervises management57. It adds the element of checks and balances to the 
corporate structure. The board members have a fiduciary duty to all their shareholders 
and are accountable to them and to the corporation58. There is no standard global practice 
that maps out how the board ought to be composed or the methodology of how to achieve 
its role59. Each board determines its own procedures. However what remains constant is 
that it lies at the center of all governance models.  
 Governance is concerned about the need for directors to stand for elections 
regularly, to disclose their remuneration, the presence of non-executive directors and the 
establishment of independent committees of the board. However in certain situations like 
bankruptcy, the structure of corporate control is altered and does not rest with the board 
of directors. In these instances corporate control may rest with a Trustee, Receiver or by 
whatever name they may be called in different jurisdictions. 
 
Executive Management. 
The managers are the technocrats involved in the day to day running of the business. 
Their traditional focus is on planning, organizing, motivating, controlling and 
coordinating60. They are concerned with internal relationships and procedures. Corporate 
governance is not concerned with this level of running the corporation per se, but with 
giving it an overall direction that normally starts at the level of Executive Director. It is a 
                                                                 
57Mary E. Kissane, Global flies: Applications and Implementations of US Style Corporate 
Governance Abroad, 17 n.y. l. sch. j. int’l & comp.L.621, 625 (1997). 
58 Monks, supra note 4, at 182-184. 
59  Kissane, supra note 57. 
60 Tricker, supra note 5, at 6. 
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function that is quite distinct from management. Governance is largely concerned with 
the relationship of the corporation to the institutions and environment within which it 
functions61. It involves setting the corporate direction and is involved in executive action, 
supervision and accountability62.  
 
Corporate Stakeholders. 
These stakeholders include the employees, banks, auditors, regulators, creditors, 
customers, suppliers and the community. Corporate stakeholders are generally free to 
bargain their contracts and agreements with the company that, to a large degree, defines 
the relationship of the stakeholders to the corporation.  
For instance in the civil law jurisdiction of Germany and Japan, banks plays a huge role 
in the corporate structure63. Overall governance must take into account the existence of 
duties and responsibilities that a corporation has, under general law, to all these bodies. It 
makes managers internalize the welfare of these stakeholders in the firm64.  
 
C. Enforcement Mechanisms. 
Corporate governance is enforced through a framework of laws, regulatory institutions 
and reporting requirements that condition the way the corporate sector is managed65. The 
laws that govern the relationship of the corporate constituents to the corporation are 
                                                                 
61 Worthy, supra note 40, at 4. 
62 Tricker, supra note 5, at 10. 
63 Vives, supra note 10, at 3. 
64 Id at 1. 
65 Halpern, supra note 50, at 6. 
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defined by legislation and by the laws of the market place66. Regarding the former, this 
enforcement and regulation comes in the form of case law, legislation and corporate 
practice67. Simultaneously an enforcement role is played by corporate regulators such as 
the Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission whose monitoring is 
an important element in the area of disclosure68. Corporate governance is also enforced 
through checks and balances to maintain legitimacy and credibility in the system69. This 
is done mostly through independent non-executive directors and auditors. 
 Markets play an important role in the enforcement process. An efficient market 
monitors managerial activities through the presence of information on the corporations. 
But this only happens if the corporation operates in an efficient market70. 
 
D. Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
 
Efficiency and Corporate Governance. 
There has been skepticism about the benefits of corporate governance especially in the 
light of so many other issues like competitors, financing and marketing which seem to 
                                                                 
66 Monks, supra note 31, at 21. 
67 Maw, supra note 28, at 4; Vives, supra note 10, at 3 .Where the article states that the quality of 
legal protection provided by corporate governance is measured by (1) the exercise of the 
shareholders right to elect the board and vote on matter like mergers (2) the enforcement of the 
boards fiduciary duties (3) enforcement by creditors exercising their right to repossess assets or 
collateral thereby altering the management structure through a reorganization and (4) the quality 
of legal empowerment and the standards of accounting. 
68 Id at 6. 
69 Monks, supra note 31, at 23. 
70 Halpern, supra note 50, at 6. 
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have the investors’ priority71. One of the issues that corporate governance is concerned 
about is finding that delicate balance between the need to hold companies accountable 
without making the requirements too burdensome that the economic efficiency of the 
corporation is impaired72.  
 A research in the United States asked Chief Executive Officers and other top 
executives whether they were willing to pay more for the stock of a well-governed 
corporation. They were asked to compare two well performing companies and state 
whether they would pay more for the stock of one of these companies if it was well 
governed.   The response was in the affirmative. As one Chief Executive Officer 
explained,  
“Good corporate governance is somewhat akin to the headlights of a car. If these two 
companies are in a daytime race nothing goes wrong – then they are evenly matched. If 
the race goes past dusk, however, the company with good governance has the headlights 
to deal with the problem.”73. 
 
According to this research74, over one hundred investors, chief executive officers and 
senior executives said that good governance made a difference which investors were 
willing to pay for. The study identified three types of investors who cared about good 
governance. They could be separated into three groups; the investors with lower turnover 
ratios who held shares longer and believed that good governance would improve the 
companies performance in the long run, investors who pursued a ‘value strategy’ by 
                                                                 
71 Robert Felton et al, Putting a Value on Board Governance, 170 the mckinsey quarterly (1996) 
72 Swanson, supra note 39, at 417. 
73 Felton, supra note 71, at 36. 
74  Id . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
investing in under valued corporations with low price/earnings ratio in the hope that the 
company would grow. They believed a good board would help improve under performing 
stock and capture hidden value. The third group were investors who managed money for 
high net worth individuals, endowments, foundations and public pensions. 
 The four main reasons these investors would pay a good premium for good 
governance were; a belief that a company would perform well over time and this would 
lead to higher returns, that it reduced the likelihood of bad things happening to the 
company and even if they did happen, a well governed company would rebound more 
easily. Finally some investors did so because the governance debate was a considered ‘a 
fad’.  
 While this study did not show that corporate governance was a top priority, 
because items like strategy, cash flow, and competitive position ranked higher, it 
nonetheless showed that governance occupied a position somewhere on the priority list. 
This led to the conclusion that believing in the value of corporate governance should no 
longer be a question of good faith. 
 That said, however, the existence of a clear link between corporate governance 
and corporate performance is not self-evident. It is a mere hypothesis75. There have been 
some empirical studies done that have been undertaken to establish this connection. Some 
of these studies have established that regulatory and institutional structures influence the 
development of stock markets76. Another has shown that the mandatory disclosure of 
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76 William Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and 
 
 
 
 
17 
reliable information is directly proportional to a firm’s ability to encourage investor 
participation in the stock market77. While a third study done to test national systems 
against different indices like shareholder protection, ownership concentration and the 
financial system showed a positive co-relation between the level of legal investor 
protection on the one hand and the size of the market and prevalence of dispersed 
shareholders on the other hand78. 
 
The Role of Competition. 
One argument raised about the relationship between corporate governance and efficiency 
is the role of competition79. It has been argued that competition is a powerful force for 
ensuring good corporate governance. For instance, if managers of a firm are wasteful or 
consume large amounts of resources, the firm will be unable to compete favorably and 
will go bankrupt.80 
That the role of competition in providing information and an environment for comparison 
acts as a catalyst for efficiency81.  It forces the board and management to be disciplined. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Comparative Corporations Governance, 2 theoretical inquiries 745, 751 (2001) 
77 Id. 
78 Id at 751. 
79 Allen, supra note 43, at 56. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
 
A.   Distinguishing Corporate Governance in Common law and  
Civil Law Jurisdictions.  
The evolution of corporate governance has taken place world wide at different paces and 
systems differ even amongst the worlds advanced market economies82. Systems have 
evolved differently mainly due to varied historical, political, social and economic 
backgrounds83. But perhaps the most important influence could be attributed to the legal 
jurisdictions that have shaped the way corporations are governed in different countries84. 
Legal jurisdictions are broadly divided into two groups; civil law and common law. The 
starting point of the governance debate in either jurisdiction is not the same85. The civil 
law jurisdiction, also known as Romano Germanic, is predominantly found in continental 
Europe and other countries influenced by that part of Europe. It utilizes statutes and 
comprehensive codes as the primary means of organizing its legal principles86.  The 
common law tradition is found in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and other 
countries whose modern development was heavily influenced by these nations. It is 
                                                                 
82 William R Emmons et al, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance in Corporate 
Governance: Economic and Financial Issues 66 (Kevin Keasey et al, eds., 1997).  
83 Gilson, supra note 22, at 329. 
84 Emmons, supra note 82, at 66. 
85 Maw, supra note 28, at 119. 
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characterized by Judge made laws and the use of precedents87. However its important to 
note that even though common law countries share a common history in their legal 
system, to a large extent their internal judicial systems have subsequently had 
independent developments. These countries, albeit being part of the same legal system, 
have differences amongst themselves88. However, comparative legal scholars generally 
agree that countries following common law share more critical features with each other 
than with members of other legal groups. In the civil law system, countries have 
developed more independently and diverged from each other more than countries under 
common law89.  
 Corporate governance in the common law system is market oriented90. It is also 
referred to as the shareholder-market model or the stock market-centered capital model91. 
It is characterized by a liquid stock market and dispersed ownership of public 
corporations92. Shareholders own the corporation’s equity and it fluctuates depending on 
how well the company is doing93. The investing public are the direct risk takers94. Banks 
act as a source of extra funds but generally play a limited role95. The possibilities of 
                                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Emons, supra note 82, at 69. 
90 Kissane, supra note 57, at 622.  
91 Gilson, supra note 22, at 329. 
92 Kissane, supra note 57, at 622. 
93 Cunningham, supra note 24, at 1136.  
94 Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate 
Governance; Which Model of capitalism,  23 brook.j.int’l.833, 834 (1998). 
95 Vives, supra note 10, at 2. Where it states that in the United States the Glass-Steagall Act, 
repealed in November 1999, kept banks out of corporate governance by not allowing them to own 
equity. In the United Kingdom, though the banks were not restricted, they did not get involved. 
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takeovers, proxy fights and boardroom coups are not foreign concepts to this model96. In 
contrast, the civil system is referred to as the bank/labor model97or the bank-centered 
capital model98. It is characterized by concentrated family control of large businesses99. 
Capital for both debt and equity financing is supplied by banks100. These banks enter into 
long term and stable relationships with the corporations101. They also own large amounts 
of stock in these companies102. There is no active liquid capital market because of the 
presence of concentrated ownership and bank debt holdings103. This means that the 
jurisdiction requires fewer regulatory mechanisms as compared with the market model 
that requires a complex system of checks and balances104. 
 In the market model, shareholders are the owners of the corporation. But 
management rests in the hands of the directors105. The relationship of the employees, 
suppliers, creditors and customers to the corporation is set by contracts. In the bank/labor 
model, the board and managers operate the firm in the interest of all the stakeholders and 
not just the shareholders106.  
These differences have been conceptualized in a theory that refers to the market 
model as contractualism and the bank-labor model as communitarian107. Shareholders lie 
                                                                 
96 Bratton, supra note 76. 
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at the center of the contractualism model and the corporations primary concern is to 
them108. The corporation is viewed as a myriad of contracts, which together with market 
forces act to regulate the relationship between the shareholders and the managers109. In 
the communitarian school of thought, the corporation has a social responsibility to all 
stakeholders110. 
 The existence of these diverse practices has ignited a debate over which system of 
corporate governance is better111. Theory has emerged that the ‘competition’ between the 
shareholder market model and bank/labor model systems of governance will lead them to 
converge and form a single efficient system112. Interestingly some scholars have argued 
that the convergence will result in a worldwide replication of the American system by 
larger corporations113.  That this convergence would either be functional convergence or 
formal114. The idea of such convergence has been heavily criticized as presumptuous and 
impractical115.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
contractarian approach and those holding communitarian ideals. The differences mirror the 
characteristics of the market model and the bank/labor models of corporate governance 
respectively. 
108 Monks, supra note 31, at 268. 
109 Fort supra note 45, at 837. 
110  Id at 835. 
111 McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible but not Desirable  47 vill. l. rev, 
341. 
112 Bratton, supra note 76, at 474, explains this theory as a “convergence project.” The article 
assumes that in the meantime both systems possess equal competitive fitness. 
113 McDonnell, supra note 111, at 345, sums up the views of scholars in favor of the notion that 
eventually all governance systems will replicate the American system; Henry Hansmann & 
Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 geo. l. J. 439(2001) contains the 
most blunt statement that this convergence to the United States system will bring the evolution of 
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114 Branson supra note 26, at 323. 
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 While subsequent discussion will show that countries are now increasingly 
changing practices to attract foreign investment, the fact is they have still retained 
features that make them distinct. The next section explores the salient features of 
corporate governance practices in selected countries, which collectively represent the 
civil and common law legal jurisdictions. 
 
B.  National Corporate Governance Systems. 
The review of these systems will be limited to; the board of directors, shareholder 
participation, stakeholders and major factors that have influenced the systems. This 
analysis is based on past research conducted in this field.  
 
Germany. 
The distinct feature of Germanys company law is the two-tier board of directors system 
that is a legal requirement for all stock companies employing five hundred or more 
employees116. This legal system has a unique management structure that comprises two 
boards of directors; the management board with executive responsibilities, vorstand and 
the supervisory board with control functions, Aufsichtsrat117. The former board is 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the business while the latter is concerned 
with the supervision118. The two boards are so distinct in character and composition that 
                                                                 
116 Monks, supra note 31, at 287. 
117 Klaus Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board; A German View On Corporate Governance 3 
(Klaus Hopt et al, eds. 1997). 
118 Angel Quendo, Breaking Through to the Other Side; Understanding Continental European 
Corporate Governance, 22 u. pea.j. int’l econ.L.975 (2001). 
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members of one board cannot sit on the other119. The supervisory board, management 
boards and shareholders are the three legal organs that meet at the annual general 
meeting120. The other two features that stand out in Germany are the voting strengths of 
the banks and the power of the labor force121.  
The origin of the board system in Germany dates back to the beginning of 
German Corporation law and reform in the nineteenth century122. The supervisory board, 
the Aufsichtsrat, was formed to substitute the state charter and previously existing 
continuous state controls were abolished123. Its duty is to supervise management and 
attend to the long term strategic planning of the corporation124. Its power over 
management extends to making appointments, dismissals and fixing remuneration for the 
management board125. While it does not make management decisions, it approves certain 
actions contemplated126. The supervisory board is composed of shareholders, the 
workforce and trade union representatives. They are appointed, respectively, by the 
shareholders, the workers of the corporation and the trade union127. Their ratio on the 
boards is determined by general law that requires that in companies with a work force of 
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less than 2000 employees, one third of the supervising board shall be elected by the 
employees. In larger corporations, the ratio of employees would be half128.  
 The management board represents the company in third party dealings and 
submits regular report to the supervisory board129. The members are appointed for five-
year terms by the supervisory board and may be dismissed for compelling reasons130. 
Critics however fear that the close interaction of these boards may affect objective 
supervision131.  
 In a country known for its extensive banking network, banks play a prominent 
role in the governance of corporate entities. They are in a position to exercise this 
influence by virtue of their significant holding in the majority of German companies and 
through their representation on the supervisory boards of about two thirds of Germanys 
listed companies132. Even though the banks representation on company boards has greatly 
reduced, the influence of German banks is much wider in context than their mere 
presence on the supervisory board133. Their real influence comes from the combination of 
the supervisory board seats, stock participation, bank proxy votes and the banks credit 
and underwriting business134. In addition, although wealthy individuals and families as 
well as non-financial firms tend to be large stockholders, the individual investors will 
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129 Cunningham, supra note 24, at 1140. 
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normally give the banks proxy-voting authority to administer these shares on their 
behalf135. 
 The employees’ presence on the supervisory board can be traced to the end of the 
First World War136. This practice of worker participation on the board commonly referred 
to as co-determination was further ingrained in 1976 when the current legal framework in 
Germany was established137. Co-determination refers to the dual-board structure peculiar 
to Germany and is modeled on a theory that because labor and capital co-determine a 
corporation’s future, both should be represented on the supervisory board138. The role 
played by the employees is a question of debate. But their presence has definitely been 
consolidated by the fact that two-thirds of the employees pension contributions are 
retained within the corporation and this represents a source of internal revenue to the 
corporations139. 
 The result of the corporate structure means that the board represents a wide range 
of interests beyond just the shareholder140. Less emphasis is placed on dividends, as 
compared to the United Kingdom and the United States. More emphasis is placed on the 
long-term viability of the company141.  Shareholders are concerned more with the 
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companies’ strategic plans than with dividends142. Perhaps owing to this reduced status, 
the shareholder meeting in Germany has been compared to communist party conventions 
where people are not encouraged to dissent143. 
 
Japan. 
The Japanese corporate governance system is best understood from a historical 
perspective following the Second World War. The shortage of capital pushed banks into 
prominence because they played the dual role of holding shares in corporations and 
simultaneously providing capital, which, amongst other things, allowed corporations to 
invest in shares of other companies144. Resulting from this history, banks play a key role 
in corporate governance. 
Japanese company law is codified in the Japanese Commercial Law145. It has its 
origins form the late nineteenth century Germany and though it resembles the German 
system in some ways, it differs in many respects146. One thing it did not import was the 
German dual board system because following American occupation, after the Second 
World War, it imported many United States rules which included the American style 
board of directors147. The Japanese board is a management board that is comprised almost 
entirely of full time employees or former employees148. It is described as ‘homogenous’ 
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because it is generally composed of; about twenty-five men, at least 50 years old and 
most of whom are former employees149. Corporations must have at least three directors 
elected by shareholders to serve fixed terms not exceeding two years. The directors are 
bound by fiduciary duties to the shareholders that elected them150. However shareholders 
rarely seek the enforcement of fiduciary duties151. The presence of outside directors is a 
rare phenomenon152. 
 Another significant feature is the large companies whose stock is held by 
‘concentrated shareholders‘153. Stable shareholders that include other corporations, major 
creditors, major customers or suppliers hold the majority of these shares154. This 
shareholding is done on reciprocal basis and has resulted in a dense network of mutual 
shareholding155. This network, known as keiretsu, refers to a group of corporations in 
which the individual firms each own some stock of the other member firms156. Apart 
from corporations, banks and insurers also own large stock in the keiretsu firms equal to 
about 5% each thus creating a voting block of over 20% of the keiretsu stock157. A clear 
pattern emerges where the majority of shareholders in Japan are corporations that are 
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both shareholders and stakeholders in the corporation158. The role played by individual 
shareholders is minimal159. 
 The keiretsu’s monitor the firms that it has an interest in. They conduct much of 
this monitoring at monthly meetings of the keiretsu president’s council160. This is 
essentially a ‘second board’ on which the presidents of the keiretsu member boards sit. 
Though the council does not vote, members of the companies’ boards will not act 
contrary to the council’s opinion. They will also consult the council when one of the 
keiretsu firms is about to make a major decision161. 
 The banks are involved in monitoring and will usually choose one bank from 
amongst them to conduct this monitoring162. They are generally forceful and will 
intervene when a company goes into financial problems by sending in their own set of 
directors. Together, the keiretsu and the banks exercise tremendous power over 
managers163. The government also plays a major role in regulating businesses164. 
 
United Kingdom. 
The formal system of corporate governance in the United Kingdom is a very traditional 
one165. Very little of the corporate model has changed from that which was devised by 
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parliament in the middle of the nineteenth century166. The control of the company is 
determined by its share structure167. The opinions of the majority shareholders rule. With 
the decrease of individual equity ownership168 and an increase of institutional 
shareholding, this majority ownership is increasingly lying in the hands of institutional 
shareholders169. Even though historically these institutional investors have traditionally 
influenced management behind closed doors, they are now more visible in their 
confrontations170. The value of their equity holding has made them the most important 
single group holding securities171. The main reason for their growth stems from the 
expansion of pension funds available for investment as a result of increased private 
retirement savings and a growth of insurance companies172. However unlike in the United 
States where similar change precipitated corporate governance, in the United Kingdom 
institutional investors were not active but reactive in taking an active role in the 
development of corporate governance173. 
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 Shareholders are central to the corporation and they exercise corporate suffrage 
by voting for the board174.  There is no worker representation on the board and though 
this idea was floated in the 1970’s, it did not take effect175. The board’s main duty is to 
overlook the affairs of the company and ensure management performs efficiently176. It is 
typically composed of senior full time executives and non-executives or outside 
directors177. All directors owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders and are collectively 
responsible for the decisions taken by the board178. 
 The British governance system differs from continental European systems179. It 
resembles the United States in many ways with some salient differences180. Both 
countries have adopted a shareholder model181. Very few large corporations are 
controlled by dominant owners and the majority of shareholders are dispersed182. These 
management executives have typically run the corporation183. But unlike the United 
States, Britain has a non-executive chairman on the majority of its boards and a majority 
of inside directors184. The governance debate in this jurisdiction has mainly been on the 
                                                                 
174 Davis, supra note 165, at 48. 
175 Id. 
176 Maw, supra note 28, at 4. 
177 Cheffins, supra note 8, at 8. 
178 Id. 
179 Davis, supra note 165, at 48. 
180 Monks, supra note 31, at 303. 
181 Kissane, supra note 57, at 624. 
182 Cheffins, supra note 8, at 12. 
183 Id at 15. 
184 Monks, supra note 31, at 303. Only 42 percent of all directors are outsiders and 9 per cent of 
the largest UK companies have no outside directors at all. 
 
 
 
 
31 
role of non-executive directors and institutional shareholders in monitoring executive 
performance185. 
 The corporate governance debate in the United Kingdom reached a climax in 
1991 when the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the 
accountancy profession set up the Cadbury Committee to examine the financial aspects of 
corporate governance. This became necessary following concerns of an apparent lack of 
confidence in financial reporting and in the effective supervision of management by 
company boards186. The reasons for this negativity were well summed by the Cadbury 
committee chairman Sir Adrian Cadbury who said that; 
 
"The harsh economic climate is partly responsible, since it has exposed company reports 
and accounts to unusually close scrutiny. It is, however, the continuing concern about 
standards of financial reporting and accountability, heightened by Bank of Credit and 
Commerce, Maxwell and the controversy over directors' pay, which has kept corporate 
governance in the public eye"187. 
 
The Cadbury committee had the task of codifying the responsibilities of executive and 
non-executive directors, audit committees, auditors and linking the responsibilities of the 
board, shareholders and auditors188. The work resulted in the Cadbury Code of Best 
Practice. It had a wide range of recommendations189. Though many of its guidelines were 
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not applied in the United Kingdom, the report is credited with improving corporate 
standards in companies190. 
 Subsequent to the Cadbury committee, two other committees were set up in 1995. 
The Greensburg committee and the Hampel committee. Both were named after their 
respective chairmen. The first committee was convened to explore the issue of directors’ 
remuneration191. This committee recommended the composition of remuneration sub-
committees composed of non-directors and it also called for increased shareholder 
participation and transparency192. Many of its recommendations were incorporated in the 
stock exchange listing rules193. 
 The Hampel Committee studied the recommendations of the two previous 
committees and explored how they could be achieved. Its focus was on three areas; 
disclosure of executive pay, the role the executive and non-executive directors and the 
participation of institutional investors194. It concluded its work in 1998195. Its final report 
culminated in the ‘Combined Code’ which was attached to the listing rules of the London 
Stock Exchange, also referred to as the ‘Yellow Book’. Listed companies are expected to 
observe these rules in this yellow book196. 
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United States of America. 
Focusing on the last three decades in the United States, the corporate governance debate 
and its development was catalyzed by certain key events. Firstly while for many years 
publicly traded corporations raised capital by selling shares to the public, managers still 
retained corporate control over the companies. This was largely because the shareholder 
base was composed of several unconnected individuals who did not have the ability to 
influence management197. Individually, shareholders had little clout to influence any 
changes198. Hence the  ‘wall street rule’ was the route to take. Translated, it meant that if 
shareholders did not agree with the way management conducted the business, they were 
free to sell their shares and walk away199. 
 An increase in the financial wealth of United States households was directly 
proportional to an increase of pensions and mutual funds because a number of families 
chose to invest in them200.  Furthermore the enactment of legislation in the United States 
permitting pension funds and trusts to invest in equities was an added attraction that saw 
the growth of institutional investors in the capital market201. The increase of these 
institutional investors took place over the last three decades202. This resulted in a 
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significant change in the ownership of public corporations. Similar to the United 
Kingdom, institutional investors represented the largest number of individual investors. 
As a result they not only held significant blocks of shares, they had the power of attorney 
to act as though they were the equity holders. Because they managed large blocks of 
equity, it became impractical for unsatisfied institutional investors to divest themselves of 
their interests and exercise the ‘wall street rule’ as this would impact negatively on the 
value of their shares. Instead they chose to maintain their equity holding but begun 
pressing for changes and exploring for ways to exercise their influence in corporations 
failing to live up to their expectations. One way was by demanding their representation 
on the boards. By the 1970’s and 1980’s most corporations added outside directors to 
their boards so that most boards now consisted of at least a majority of outside 
directors203. 
One of the institutional investors who rejected the ‘wall street rule’ and believed 
that the most responsible and successful investor approach was to present shareholder 
concerns directly to management and encourage it to make changes was the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA-CREF)204.  In 1993, it released a detailed list 
of its corporate governance policies that it intended to pursue on all its portfolio 
companies205. Its statement focused on a need for boards of directors to have a majority 
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of outside directors, compensation and adequate disclosure206. Other institutional 
investors like the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS) joined in 
the 'institutional activism’ and public companies were forced to hear their voices207.  
 Other reasons that precipitated corporate governance was the 1980’s period that 
was characterized by takeovers, leveraged buyouts and junk bonds208. Corporations 
responded to these threats by adopting charters and by-laws that included poison pills, 
classified boards et al. This created tension amongst institutional investors who felt the 
boards and management tried to entrench themselves and frustrate the shareholders desire 
to get an immediate premium on their shares209. The investors again recognized that their 
influence on the board would only be possible if they were represented.  
 By 1982 the Corporate Governance Project of the American Law Institute (ALI) 
had begun to work on its first, albeit controversial, draft of the principles on Corporate 
Governance. This was probably the first documented attempt to articulate this topic and 
give it boundaries and substance210. The institute examined corporate governance widely 
and produced the principles in 1994. However, the importance of the project was 
overshadowed by controversy and difficulties resulting from the plethora of corporation 
law that existed211. The principles addressed issues concerned with the objective and the 
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conduct of business, corporate structure, management fiduciary obligations and remedies. 
The results of this project were unsatisfactory to many and most agree that the principles 
will have little effect212. 
 One unique feature in the American legal system is federalism. Its significance on 
corporate governance is that persons wishing to incorporate a company have a choice of 
State corporation law213.  Irrespective of where that corporation selects to operate from, 
under the principle known as internal affairs, the laws that shape its corporate governance 
structure will be determined by the incorporating state with occasional exception214. 
Traditionally states have the power to regulate the relationship between corporations, 
management and shareholders through legislation and judicial rulings215. It has even been 
suggested that states are in a race to the bottom to attract companies to incorporate by 
lowering the standard of shareholder protection216. Whatever the case, corporate 
governance cannot be understood only by reference to state law217. Though the federal 
government has not created comprehensive federal corporation laws, technically it 
could218.  However, even in the absence of such federal laws, many federal statutes affect 
various aspects of corporate governance and these laws have to be taken into account219. 
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 While the intricacies of the substantive corporate governance systems differ from 
state to state, and corporation to corporation, corporate governance principles in the 
United States can be described in terms of generally favored practices220. Shareholders 
occupy a prominent place as the residual owners of the company221. They lie at the center 
of the governance system. Most public corporations have boards of directors that are 
composed of a majority outside directors. These directors are mostly drawn from ranks of 
current or retired chief executive officers of other corporations. Its also not uncommon to 
find university resident academicians and scientists appointed board members to 
corporations whose line of business they share at an academic level222. The boards 
oversee the management of corporations. The directors and management owe the 
corporation and its shareholders fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. They are bound by 
these standards and there is a mechanism to enforce them223.  Under common law, courts 
have endorsed the business judgment doctrine, which creates an assumption that the 
board makes a decision that is reasonable, and safe224. If the board breaches the business 
judgment rule, shareholders may commence derivative actions against the defaulting 
board on their own behalf and that of the corporations, Companies also have audit 
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committees, which liaise with the corporation’s external auditors. These committees are 
usually composed of outside directors225.  
 The Securities and Exchange Commission is a key agency whose rule making 
authority affects a corporation’s governance226. One significant way it has achieved this 
is by requiring corporations to set up special committees to the board. The most 
significant being the audit committee227. The audit rules set out the qualifications for 
directors who serve on the committee and define how the outside committees will relate 
to the audit committee228. The various Stock Exchange’ also adopt rules in their manuals 
that govern listing companies by requiring them to comply with their rules which affect 
governance. The most notable exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange and the 
American Stock Exchange.  
 
C. International Investors in a Corporate Governance Maze. 
Advances in telecommunications and the convenience of international travel coupled 
with expanding stock exchanges and pension funds have collectively increased 
globalization and demanded that those who control large companies have to be aware of 
governance systems beyond their own229. There are a growing number of companies that 
seek to raise capital abroad and a corresponding large fraction of investors who are 
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investing funds outside their home countries230. For instance, a French corporation may 
seek to issue securities in Great Britain that residents in the United States or Canada may 
purchase. Thereafter an initial purchaser may in turn resale the French issuer’s securities 
to other investors in other countries located on different continents231.  
 These investors look to corporate governance standards to protect their funds232. 
For these reasons international investors acting as issuer or purchaser, perhaps more than 
ever, need to understand the structure of different corporate governance regimes in 
various countries233. As yet, there is no single corporate governance practice. When it 
comes to regulating cross border security transaction, countries apply their laws only to 
transactions that have connection with their territorial jurisdiction234. But two schools of 
thought have been advanced on this matter. The first is that a corporation’s home country 
should regulate all transactions regardless of the location of the transaction, while the 
second school of thought calls for the harmonization of different securities regimes235. 
 The desire to diversify their portfolios has caused institutional investors, 
particularly in America, to increasingly make significant investments abroad236. Although 
on unfamiliar territories, these investors continue to use shareholder activism to minimize 
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their risk and costs of investing abroad237. The presence of these foreign investors has had 
an impact on various national systems. For instance, United States institutional investors 
have urged European companies to make significant changes to their formal governance 
institutions to resemble United States style institutions238. Countries like the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan have had to make changes239. In Germany 
particularly, excessive influence by the banks has emerged as a key structural problem as 
the German capital markets compete for global investment240. Federal legislation to 
reduce shareholding has been introduced by the ruling party241. Japan is also moving 
toward a share holder-market model242.  
 Public corporations have also bent backwards in order to attract capital. Daimler-
Benz was willing to change its accounting and disclosure practices in order to be eligible 
to list its securities on the New York Stock Exchange243. Conversely the rejection of 
Rupert Murdoch’s proposed listing by the Australian stock exchange because he wanted 
to sell non-voting stock demonstrated how crucial governance considerations are244. All 
these participants face scrutiny by investors, regulators, the media and the general public 
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as they develop and refine standards of corporate governance that will allow them 
compete for the attention of investors245. 
 Securities Exchanges worldwide have responded to cross border investments with 
many exchanges forming partnerships with one another that cut across international 
boundaries. Frankfurt and London stock exchanges announced a plan to integrate their 
facilities and permit trading of each other’s listed securities on both exchanges246. Other 
Exchanges in France, Italy and Spain also expressed their wish to enter into mergers247. 
 In the global financial market, practices are being transformed to respond to the 
investor’s search for international capital. Hence while core national governance systems 
remain diverse, certain spheres, particularly in the area of accounting and disclosure have 
become more global and more responsive to the current era.  Under a project commenced 
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions International (IOSCO) 
international investors can use international disclosure standards that facilitate cross 
border equity activities without compromising the amount or equality of information they 
receive248. Similarly, International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) gives 
foreign corporations the option to prepare financial statements for foreign listings by 
using IASC standards249.  
                                                                 
245 Kissane, supra note 57, at 624. 
246 Cunningham, supra note 24, at 1151 and FN75. See Edmund L. Andrews, London & Frankfurt 
Stock Exchanges Form Alliance, N. Y. Times, July 8, 1998, at d4 to read about proposed 
agreements between the securities exchanges.  
247 Allan Cowell, French agree to a European Stock Exchange, N.Y. Times, November 20, 1998, 
at C6.  
248 The SEC Speaks in 2001, 1235 pli/corp 977, 984 (2001). 
249 Id at 98.3 
 
 
 
 
42 
 While the globalization of finance is growing stronger with respect to investment, 
barriers continue to exist with regard to banking services presumably because they are 
strategically tied to a nations economy resulting in their protection from outside 
competition250.  The result of the standardized finance options allow investor’s access to 
information that will enable them compare the benefits of investing in companies 
throughout the world251. It also allows them to compare corporate performance at a global 
level. 
 
D. Multinational Corporations and Governance. 
A multinational corporation is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment and 
owns or controls value-adding activities in more than one country252. This can be 
distinguished from international trading firms and domestic firms because it engages both 
in cross-border production and transactions253. The growth of huge multinational 
corporations is touted as one of the most striking worldwide economic developments of 
the late 1990’s and early 21st century254. They are vehicles for the movement of capital, 
goods and services in the global economy255. Predictions are that by 2010, the number of 
multinationals will be several times the number that existed a few years ago256. The 
driving force behind this is a quest to be one of the largest corporations in a given field on 
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a global scale257. In 1999, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) World Investment Report estimated that the total number of parent 
corporations worldwide was almost 60,000 with half a million foreign associates258. 
 Several issues surround multinational corporations but the scope of this paper 
extends its interest only to the implications of international corporate governance 
practices on multinational corporations and vice versa. A multinational company’s choice 
of domicile involves choosing amongst different governance structures. The corporate 
governance challenge presented in well-developed governance systems is which domicile 
the corporation shall choose to operate in. That decision can affect its competitiveness in 
the open market and if it did, the corporation would choose to relocate elsewhere259.  
 Conversely, multinational corporations may also take advantage of weak 
governance systems in developing nations260 When they do, the corporate governance 
challenge existing in this scenario changes. In the absence of strong enforcement 
mechanisms, multinationals have been accused of violating labor, human rights and 
environmental rights261. An increased interest by non-governmental organizations and the 
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press in the activities of multinational corporations has served to highlight these 
factors262. They have successfully acted as watchdogs of the system. 
The negative activities publicized are inconsistent with the mandate of directors 
who are expected to act in the best interest of the shareholders and corporation as a 
whole263. The result of such activities may reduce the corporations profitability through 
cost of litigation or fines imposed on the defaulting corporation. For economic and moral 
reasons, most institutional investors are committed to investing in socially responsible 
enterprises, as they believe that they maximize shareholders returns264. The notion of 
‘ethical investment’ exists worldwide265. Investors want to be sure that the corporations 
they invest in are socially responsible. This responsibility is acknowledged by large 
multinationals. For instance in the Unites States, the Organization of Business for Social 
Responsibility was founded in 1992 to emphasize social responsibility. The organization 
boasts of a membership of fourteen hundred corporations including Coco-cola, Federal 
Express, Motorola and many other multinationals. Countries like Australia have passed 
laws that impose minimum standards of conduct by Australian companies of a defined 
size operating in foreign countries. 
 Multinational corporations need to use best practices principles when setting up 
shop in jurisdictions that have weak governance practices or enforcement measures. For 
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reasons already discussed in this chapter, this is a subject that must occupy high priority 
on their agenda. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
A.  Impact of Globalization on the Corporate Governance Debate. 
Global processes are changes whose effects are felt and experienced beyond the borders 
of a single locality. They may result from economic or political forces that create markets 
for goods and services beyond the control of any one nation266. These ‘global forces’ 
encourage new forms of economic and legal integration across different countries and 
continents267.  
 The globalization of corporate governance systems is part of the general 
globalization of markets that has world financial regulators concerned268. The debate in 
this arena has been manifested at two different levels, one as a theory on convergence and 
the second as the effort by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) to create global principles of corporate governance. The former is a theory 
premised on contemporary governance debate that the prospect of international 
convergence of corporate governance systems is imminent269. Until recently, the 
governance debate had focused on the merits of different national systems and the extent 
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to which they positively promote corporations and the regional and national economies in 
which they exist270. Now the focus has shifted to a view that these different corporate 
governance systems are achieving a high degree of uniformity and are likely to converge 
into a single standard model271.   
A study of the implications of international governance practices would not be 
complete without considering both these factors. This chapter highlights the OECD 
principles and considers the theory of convergence of corporate governance systems. 
These factors are considered in the light of their implications on investment. 
 
B. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
The closest attempt, to date, at formulating global rules of corporate governance have 
been the basic principles of corporate governance formulated by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development in 1999272. This was the first time that a full-
scale international report was produced to provide guidance to both public and private 
policy makers on corporate governance273.  
 The OECD is a predecessor to the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) that was created with a membership of eighteen countries in April 
1948 shortly after the World War Two. Its main offices were in Paris. The OEEC was 
established to oversee the Marshall plan aid to Europe and had the following aims; to 
promote cooperation and commerce in Europe’s reconstructed economies, to develop a 
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Europeans customs union and a free trade area 274. The OEEC directed its energy towards 
developing Europe’s economy and helped lay the foundation for the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Once the EEC begun to function in 1977, the aims of the OEEC 
became redundant and the members decided to create a new organization in its place, the 
OECD275. Its original membership of 21 countries has now expanded to 30 countries. The 
members include the founding Western Europe members, the United States, Canada and 
key NATO allies, Iceland and Turkey. 
 The OECDs’ main duty is to provide management consulting to member 
governments. It researches and produces policies on a myriad of topics ranging from 
trade matters to environmental issues. It also has the power to make recommendations, 
which are non-binding agreements and to make decisions, which are legally binding on 
the members. 
 In 1998, the OECD Council meeting at ministerial level asked the OECD in 
conjunction with interested bodies to develop a set of corporate governance standards and 
guidelines276. This was prompted in part, by concerns that weaknesses in the corporate 
governance system of some Asian countries led to the Asian crisis277. In response to this, 
an Ad-hoc task force was established to develop the final set of principles278. The 
negotiations took over a year and included the participation of key players279. The 
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principles were taunted as the chief response by Governments to the G-7 summit leader 
recognition of corporate governance as an important pillar of the 20th century global 
economy280. On May 26-27 1999, ministers representing 29 member countries voted the 
principles unanimously. In 2000, the OECD principles of corporate governance became 
one of the 12 core standards of global financial stability and are now used as a benchmark 
by international financial institutions281. 
 The idea behind the principles is to assist governments in their effort to evaluate 
and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in 
their countries 282. Other powerful financial bodies like the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank have jumped on the bandwagon by placing governance on their 
agendas. They have adopted the OECD principles as a guiding standard and have 
included them as a pre requisite in their programs for aid to developing countries 283. 
 
C. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
The principles are divided into five parts284. Each one dealing with aspects of corporate 
governance that the OECD has deemed to be necessary for good governance and has 
provided practical guidance. The standards provided are the minimum standards that 
countries have an obligation to meet. Additional rights may be provided in varied 
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jurisdictions. The areas outlined are; the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and the responsibilities of the board. 
 
The Rights of Shareholders. 
The OECD is concerned with the need to uphold the shareholders right to exercise 
corporate suffrage and their ability to do so from an informed position made possible by 
their access to accurate and timely information. Voting by proxy is encouraged and is 
given as equal importance as votes cast in person. 
 The shareholders ability to influence certain fundamental changes in the 
corporation like the election of the board, amendment of key documents and major 
changes to the corporations core business is protected.  Other important shareholder 
rights include the rights to dividends, to divest themselves of their shares and the right to 
know of any corporate changes that will affect the corporate assets and the exercise of 
their voting power. The principles are also mindful of the rights by shareholders, within 
limit, to contribute to the agenda of the general meeting.  
 
The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders.  
Any divergence from the ’one share one vote’ standard is frowned upon. Emphasis is 
placed on the need to give equal rights and treatment to shareholders holding shares in 
the same class. This ensures the protection of minority and foreign shareholders. They 
must be informed of the voting rights attached to the shares before purchase. 
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 The voting system should not be made too difficult or expensive such as to deny 
any shareholder the right to vote.  It is also expected that nominees should vote in a 
manner agreed upon with the beneficial owners of the shares. As part of the equitable 
treatment accorded to shareholders, the principles prohibit insider trading and self-
dealing by the corporation. 
 
The Role of Stakeholders. 
The OECD takes into account the interest of stakeholders like investors, employees, 
creditors and suppliers. It recognizes that the success of any corporation is dependent on 
teamwork and the resources that different stakeholders bring to the company.  
 Though stakeholder rights are established and may be enforced by general law, 
the corporation has a responsibility to recognize the interests of these third parties and 
their role played in achieving the corporation’s aspirations. Stakeholders are entitled, in 
the event of a falling out, to transparent and clearly outlined channels of redress. They 
should also have access to information in order to fulfill their obligations. The 
governance framework encourages the enhancement of stakeholder participation. 
Particularly for employees through their representation on boards and stock ownership 
plans.  
 
Disclosure. 
A high value is placed on the presence of strong disclosure practices. Disclosure has long 
been recognized as a tool that coerces a corporation to act in the interest of its 
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shareholders. Therefore the existence of a positive culture of disclosure attracts 
investment and maintains confidence in the system. However this disclosure must 
provide accurate, adequate and timely material information whose quality should be of 
highest standards of accounting. 
 The OECD provides a non-exclusive list of items that must be disclosed. This 
includes the financial status of the company, its objectives, major share ownership, voting 
rights, information on members of the board and key executive, their remuneration and 
any foreseeable material risk factors or issues affecting the stakeholders that the investors 
should be privy to. Other information to be disclosed includes policies relating to 
business ethics, the environment and other matters of public policy. It’s important for 
stakeholders to relate the corporation to the society within which it operates. 
 The corporation should have annual audited accounts and statements prepared by 
external auditors using high standards of accounting practices. These reports should be 
accessible to the shareholders. The company should disclose this information using the 
Internet or other technological means required in that jurisdiction. Annual reports and 
audited accounts should be accessible. Board audit committees are encouraged as they 
limit the risk of conflicts of interest.    
 
The Responsibilities of the Board. 
The OECD recognizes that even though board structures may vary, their basic duties 
remain constant. A key responsibility is to monitor management’s activities and ensure 
good returns for the shareholders while simultaneously ensuring that the corporation is 
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conducting its activities within the general framework of the existing laws. The Boards 
functions also include strategic planning and maintaining the integrity of the 
corporation’s accounts and finances. 
 The existence of independent committees like the remuneration, audit and 
nomination committees composed of non-executive board members is strongly 
encouraged. This strengthens the boards transparency and effectiveness.  The standard of 
care required of the Board is that they act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care in the best interest of the company.  
 
D. Implications of the Principles. 
The OECD principles have on the one hand been welcomed as a remarkable convergence 
on corporate governance common ground among diverse interests, practices and 
cultures285. They have gained influence as they have been embraced by leading financial 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which are 
traditional lending institutions to private sector development in emerging and developing 
nations. The significance of this is two fold. Firstly, these principles have universal 
application because both members of the OECD and non-member nations that want to 
have access to investment opportunities and financing must observe the minimum 
standards provided 286. Secondly the principles are not only confined to publicly listed 
corporations, but extend to unlisted private companies and state owned enterprises in so 
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far as either may wish to tap into the international capital market. This is true particularly 
in countries that do not have well-developed liquid capital market and generally look to 
local banks or International Finance Companies for capital. This fact was acknowledged 
at the first Pan-African consultative forum on corporate governance held in Africa in 
2001287.  
 Though the principles appear somewhat harmless, as they are non-binding and 
only for guidance purposes, the two significant factors mentioned show that they are less 
harmless and may begin the imposition of a foreign corporate culture on several Asian, 
African, South American and continental European States288. These countries, who wish 
to attract foreign aid in the form of loans, grants or under schemes of project financing 
are required to impress donors with the OECD driven standard of corporate governance 
in order to be considered as candidates for financial assistance. It is possible that non-
compliance by countries will lead to ostracism and the threat of retaliation measures that 
can harm the profitability of a countries enterprise289. 
 
E. Criticism of the Principles. 
The main argument against the OECD principle is that the ‘one size fits all’ concept of 
corporate governance means that issuers on different continents are being forced to 
comply with rules imposed by institutional investors in London or New York in order to 
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tap into the international capital market290. Because the principles have an Anglo-Saxon 
orientation, their impact on developed countries in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction will not 
be significant291. The same cannot be said of less developed nations and those falling 
outside this jurisdiction. These principles ignore the need to understand corporate 
governance systems in particular reference to their differences292. Particularly that a 
nations cultural values affects the development of its laws in general and its governance 
system in particular293. That is why the concept of a company and whose interest it serves 
varies. For instance while in the United States a corporation is primarily run in the 
interest of shareholders, in Germany and Japan it is considered irresponsible to run the 
company exclusively for the interest of shareholders. Other stakeholders and society in 
general have to be considered294. 
 Suggestions have been made that the best way to formulate minimum standards of 
global corporate governance is not by imposing this singular view of corporate 
governance on the world. But rather to ‘regionalize’ it.  This means formulating regional 
corporate governance principles for both equity based or bank based jurisdictions295. 
Another option would be to determine zones of influence and formulate principles for 
each zone. This would result in the presence of multiple principles for the main legal 
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jurisdictions and perhaps another set formulated for regions falling outside these 
jurisdictions296. 
 
F.  The Theory of Convergence. 
The theory of convergence was postulated by comparative legal scholars who viewed 
national governance systems to be in competition. They predicted that this competition 
would cause the systems to converge into a single efficient system297. This view has been 
consistently held save for a change in the desirable system that the convergence will 
replicate. For a while, the Japanese system seemed the favored one until the Japanese 
‘bubble economy’ burst298. Currently the American system is the favored one and it is the 
theory of some American scholars that other countries are in the process of converging to 
the American system299. The debate also includes how this convergence will take place. 
Whether it will be formal, where legislative action alters the basic structure of existing 
corporate governance structures or functional, where the existing structures respond to 
demands of change without altering their formal characteristics. There is no consensus on 
which mode the convergence will adopt300. But pressure will also come from the global 
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integration of financial markets. Advocates predict that this convergence will lead to 
more efficient allocation of capital and improve access to investment opportunities and 
financing301. 
 
G. Critics of the Convergence Theory of Corporate Governance Systems.  
This theory of convergence has been met with dissenting opinions. Criticism has been 
leveled against scholars who are predicting the convergence of governance systems in 
general. One criticism is that it is a mistake to impose one corporate governance system 
on another302. 
 In postulating this criticism, one strong dissent suggests how culture can be 
factored into governance. It states that cross-cultural psychology can provide means of 
evaluating international cultural differences and assessing their effect on corporate 
governance systems. By using values, which refer to desirable goals and modes of 
conduct to promote these goals, cultural differences can be grouped into predefined 
concepts that transcend nations. With the aid of numerical values, statistics can be 
obtained on national corporate governance systems and this can answer the question of 
which national culture is fundamental.  
The point being driven home is that the existence of divergent cultures causes 
fundamental concepts of governance to occupy different levels of importance and this 
makes the likelihood of convergence impractical. One example of how corporate culture 
differences can lead to a deadlock was the failure by the European Union (EU) to adopt 
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its draft fifth directive that attempted to harmonize corporate law and especially 
governance practices amongst European member countries. This failure was blamed on 
cultural differences303. The attempted exercise led to bitter feuds amongst the members 
and an expert panel concluded that differences in national cultures made the 
harmonization impossible304. 
 In further criticism of the scholarship of convergence, it has been asserted that no 
ideal structure for governance exists. Different forms will work well in different countries 
at different times. The bottom line is that each system finds its own way of holding those 
who direct the corporations accountable to other entities or persons. Whether it’s to the 
shareholders in the Anglo-American model of the United States or United Kingdom, or 
the supervisory board in Germany or by elevating governance to national culture in 
Japan305. 
 In response to the global convergence advocacy scholarship suggesting that this 
convergence will replicate the American system, it has been criticized for not being 
supported by empirical data nor having a truly global analysis306. The response is that 
even if the systems were to converge, they would not necessarily follow the best one307. 
To their credit, the scholars advocating for convergence to the United States system admit 
that a single model is unlikely to emerge even though the trend continues in that 
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direction308. Convergence may very well occur in financial accounting and disclosure 
standards but it won't be easy in corporate governance309. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis introduced the general elements of corporate governance and the variety of 
national corporate governance systems that exist. Their differences can be accounted for 
at two levels. Firstly they are distinguishable by the attributes of the legal jurisdiction to 
which they belong to, be it common law or civil law. Secondly, even within similar legal 
jurisdictions countries differ at individual levels. Important national differences exist in 
law and practice. Scholars have further attributed these differences to legal, cultural, 
political and social factors. What is certain is that these differences have led to 
competition at corporate and national levels. The result of which has led countries to 
compete by incorporating best practices to their corporate governance system310. After 
all, investors will be attracted by markets with the most open shareholder governance 
structure and will be repelled by low dividends, shareholder gagging or weak disclosure 
laws311. Corporate governance does matter to individual investors, institutional investors, 
local or multinational corporations, nations and at a general international level. 
 This thesis has also shown that the implications are clear. For investors, it is 
imperative that they become familiar with different governance systems. Companies 
seeking to raise capital abroad and investors diversifying their portfolios with foreign 
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investment must deal with corporate governance practices in multiple jurisdictions312. 
The ideal solution, especially for institutional investors who have the economic power, is 
to conduct their own research. Individual investors can rely on the services of brokerage 
firms or several other firms managing investment portfolios. But as long as investors look 
beyond their borders for investment opportunities they will need to go forum shopping 
for host countries that have attractive laws. To a large extent, the laws they will be 
concerned with define the corporate governance systems. Corporate governance does 
matter. 
 For the multinational corporation, whether they are located in countries that have 
a strong or weak enforcement mechanism, the importation of best practices of 
governance practices should be the standard practice. The activities of multinational 
corporations are increasingly drawing attention and watchdogs in the form of pressure 
groups and the press are seeing to that. Only corporations with good corporate 
governance will have the social responsibility and ability to be concerned with a variety 
of issues like the environment, fair wages and child labor. These issues are not only of 
interest to the shareholders but are also important to the well being of the corporation. 
 At national level, corporate governance takes on even more importance. 
Developed nations face the challenge of constantly refining their practices in order to 
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have a competitive edge in a global environment where cross border transactions are the 
norm. Whether this competition will lead to convergence is a theory that is being floated. 
There is evidence of national governance systems making changes in order to attract 
more investors but the question of whether this will lead to convergence into any single 
model of corporate governance is currently unsupported by empirical data. 
  For developing and transitional economies, the notion of corporate governance 
goes hand in hand with good public governance and positive economic policies in order 
to be a vital element for private sector development. Good corporate governance is much 
harder to achieve in a climate of corruption, poor public and economic governance. The 
challenge is improve all three in order to attract investors. 
 The OECD principles of corporate governance have laid down minimum 
standards to be complied with by member and non-member states. However, they ignore 
the existence of different national systems of governance molded on nation’s varied 
backgrounds. Neither do they consider the fact that countries are at different stages of 
development.  The notion of ‘regional corporate governance systems’ discussed in the 
fourth chapter seems ideal. This would make the principles seem less as an imposition 
and provide a better standard to be aspired by countries in regions that share a common 
heritage.  
 That said, so far the OECD principles remain the only effort towards an attempt to 
formulate a global corporate governance system. Though they have been criticized, they 
remain a good effort largely because they expound a system based on universal principles 
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of accountability, responsibility and transparency that should be the cornerstone of every 
corporate governance system no matter the legal, economic, political or social 
background. 
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